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INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE
VII: EXPANDING MALE STANDING TO SUE
FOR INJURIES RECEIVED AS A RESULT
OF EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST FEMALES
N. Morrison Torrey*
Abstract: Historically, both men and women have had the right to seek redress under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for injuries they have received as a result of sex
discrimination. In recent years, the federal circuits have split on whether to give men
standing in one particular category of such cases: employment discrimination cases where,
although both men and women have been injured, the discrimination has been targeted
only at women. The author analyzes the recent male standing cases in the context of basic
standing principles and their past application to other types of Title VII plaintiffs. The
author concludes that a restrictive reading of standing in these cases is inconsistent with
traditional standing principles and with Title VII's stated prupose. Throughout the Arti-
cle, the author offers suggestions to plaintiffs' attorneys who must fight the standing battle
in sex discrimination cases.
Who has standing to protest sex discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964?1 Historically, both men and women
have had the right to seek redress for injuries they have received as a
result of sex discrimination.2 In recent years, however, the federal cir-
cuits have split on whether to give men standing in one particular cate-
gory of such cases: employment discrimination cases where, although
both men and women have been injured, the discrimination has been
targeted only at women.'
* Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Law. The author thanks Susan Bandes,
Mary Becker, David Rabban, and Mark Weber for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and
Stephen Jaffe and Susan Drewke for research assistance.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17 (1982) [hereinafter "Title VII"]. In general, Title VII prohibits
employment decisions based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
2. See, eg., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983)
(health insurance plan providing less favorable pregnancy benefits for spouses of male employees
than for female employees violates Title VII by discriminating against male employees); City of
Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (requiring female
employees to make larger contributions to pension fund than male employees violates Title VII
by discriminating against female employees).
3. "Traditional" sex discrimination is clearly at issue in the cases discussed in this Article.
These cases are distinct from those holding that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination
does not protect sexual preference, DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.
1979), transsexualism, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert
denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985), effeminacy, Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir.
1978), or transvestism, Sommers v. Budget Mktg, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
365
Washington Law Review Vol. 64:365, 1989
Although the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue,4 some
courts, most notably the Ninth Circuit,5 have held that men do not
have standing, but women do, to redress sex discrimination resulting
in identical injuries to both under identical circumstances. Other
courts, perhaps best represented by the Northern District of Indiana,6
have held to the contrary, finding that men can sue for injuries they
receive as a result of discrimination against their women coworkers.
Conflicting decisions such as these highlight the question of who has
standing to protest sex discrimination-a question that gains particu-
lar importance in the context of Title VII because that statute is
enforced primarily by private plaintiffs.7 Adverse standing decisions
prevent any hearing on the merits of a discrimination charge. Thus,
when injured males are denied standing because they are not the direct
target of discrimination, a technicality is allowed to frustrate Title
VII's central purpose: to eradicate discrimination in the workplace.'
One of the great ironies in these cases is that male plaintiffs have
long been recognized as more successful than female plaintiffs in the
evolution of sex discrimination law.9 At the Supreme Court level,
4. The fact that women have standing and men do not is, however, a somewhat droll twist on
the Supreme Court's distorted logic that exclusion of pregnancy from an employer's disability
plan is not gender-based: "There is no risk for which men are protected and women are not.
Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not." General Elec. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976) (quoting Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)). In
many of the instant cases, women are protected from the very same discrimination which men
must suffer without the ability to seek a remedy under Title VII.
5. See, e.g., Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1986) (men
did not have standing to protest their depressed wages allegedly resulting from their employer's
discrimination against women in the same job classification); see also Spaulding v. University of
Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.) (male faculty member of nursing school dismissed from suit
claiming pay discrimination against predominantly female nursing faculty), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1036 (1984), overruled on other grounds, Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th
Cir. 1987); AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 664 F. Supp. 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (court refused to
certify class of county civil service workers claiming discrimination against those working in
traditionally female jobs because male plaintiffs were included in class); Bastian v. Barnes &
Reinecke, Inc., No. 85 C 8041 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (male
plaintiff dismissed from suit claiming deprivation of employment benefits and promotions as a
result of his wife's rejection of their employer's sexual advances).
6. See, e.g., Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (both
male and female laid-off employees were granted standing to challenge their employer's decision
to close a plant, a decision purportedly based on discrimination aimed at the women employees);
see also EEOC v. Beaver Gasoline Co., 584 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (male plaintiff
had standing to sue under Title VII when he was demoted as a result of his employer's
discriminatory practices towards women).
7. Romasanta v. United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nonm
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
8. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976).
9. Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's Rights in a Man's World, 2 LAW &
INEQUALITY 33, 34 (1984).
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male plaintiffs have simply dominated the history of landmark sex dis-
crimination decisions.10 In fact, much of the initial litigation by the
Women's Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union1" was
premised upon a strategy of utilizing male plaintiffs to exploit the
Supreme Court's presumed capacity to perceive injustice more readily
when it is directed against men.1 2  Furthermore, recent empirical
research suggests that, as a practical matter, women are less inclined
to file suit than men when confronted with a perceived discriminatory
practice. 13
Another irony is that the failure to accord injured men standing
contradicts the expansive standing granted to any employees who
10. Id. As David Cole suggests, the list of Supreme Court sex discrimination decisions
elicited by male plaintiffs could serve as a casebook outline of the entire law in this area. Some of
the cases cited by Cole are: Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (widower challenged a
provision of the Social Security Act which allowed payment of survivor's benefits to a widow
regardless of dependency, but which allowed payment to a widower only if he was receiving at
least half of his support from his wife); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (male challenged
Oklahoma law prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21 years of age and to females
under 18); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (widower challenged section of the
Social Security Act that provided benefits to a widow and minor children on the death of a
husband, but only to minor children upon the death of a wife); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498 (1975) (male naval officer challenged federal law which mandated that male officers be
honorably discharged if they twice fail to gain promotion while allowing female officers up to
thirteen years of service before discharge for want of promotion); and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351 (1974) (widower challenged Florida statute granting widows, but not widowers, a property
tax exemption). Id at 34 n.4.
11. The Women's Rights Project ("WRP"), supported by Columbia University Law School,
was established in 1971 by the American Civil Liberties Union to establish basic sex equality
through litigation. WRP's first case was Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), in which the Supreme
Court, for the first time, recognized a constitutional protection for sex equality. Since Reed, the
WRP has represented plaintiffs in more than 30 cases. For a more complete history of WRP, see
Cowan, Women's Rights Through Litigation: An Examination of the American Civil Liberties
Union Women's Rights Project, 1972-1976, 8 COLUM. HuM. Rrs. L. REv. 373 (1976).
12. Cole, supra note 9, at 37. One commentator has noted that the "constant thread through
'women's rights' cases is that most of the winners have been men, and that women have won only
when it was not at the expense of a man." M. BERGER, LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF WOMEN: A
REVIEW FOR THE FORD FOUNDATION 19 (1980).
13. Posing a thesis that the limited success of sex discrimination litigation and its marginal
effect upon the economic status of women might result from women workers not utilizing legal
remedies available to them, two scholars examined which union members, particularly women
members, file complaints. Hoyman & Staliworth, Suit Filing by Women: An Empirical Analysis,
62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 61 (1986). The study predicts, on the basis of individual
characteristics, which uniori members (male or female) will file discrimination suits with a
government agency or through the court system. It also identifies characteristics linked with
filing: race, union activity, and single parent status. Id at 81. The study shows that women do
not appear to be filing more than men, even when suits based upon sex discrimination are
considered alone. One conclusion reached by the authors is that blacks exercise their rights
under discrimination laws but that women, for the most part, do not. Id. at 82; see also Hoyman
& Stallworth, Who Files Suits and Why: An Empirical Portrait of the Litigious Worker, 1981 ILL.
L. REV. 115.
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claim Title VII violations in other types of employment discrimination
cases-suits based on a discriminatory work environment or on a dep-
rivation of the benefits of association with protected classes-even in
the absence of a more concrete injury. 14 In reality, the male standing
cases fit snugly along side these more abstract theories of standing and
injury because all of these theories involve an injury to one person as a
result of employment discrimination directed at another. The only
distinction is in the nature of the injury: the male standing cases
involve the concrete loss of wages or even a job, rather than the intan-
gible loss of a nondiscriminatory work environment or associational
benefits.
Finally, it would seem more appropriate on a policy level to grant,
rather than deny, expanded male standing to challenge discriminatory
actions. To date, Title VII has not transformed the workplace into
one of sexual equality, as was the statute's purpose. 5 Women con-
tinue to occupy second-class status there. This subordination is appar-
ent in at least two aspects of employment: lower wages1 6 and job
segregation.17 Recent statistics show that the problem in 1988 was the
same as that acknowledged by Justice Douglas a decade and a half
ago: "Whether from overt discrimination or from the socialization
process of a male-dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to
the woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs."' 8 Thus, until job
14. See infra notes 59-87 and accompanying text (discussing discriminatory work
environment).
15. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
16. The enormous gap between women's and men's wages continues to prevail. During the
second quarter of 1988, women who usually worked fulltime had median weekly earnings of
$314, or 71% of the $445 earned by men. Women Workers Post Stronger Wage Gains Than Men
in Full-Time Jobs Since 1979, Daily Labor Report No. 149, Aug. 3, 1988, at B-5; see also Wider
Opportunities for Women, No Way Out: Working Poor Women in the United States (1325 G. St.
N.W., Washington, DC 20005) (low wages of working women linked to bias, poor skills, and
lack of childcare).
17. More than half of women employed work in sex-segregated jobs, which are defined by the
Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor as over 70% female. See Chamallas, Exploring the
"Entire Spectrum" of Disparate Treatment Under Title VIL Rules Governing Predominantly
Female Jobs, 1984 ILL. L. REv. 1, 22-23. More than 25% work in fields which are 95% or more
female. Women constitute 98% of all secretaries, 94% of all typists, and 95% of private
household workers. Id. These statistics appear to support a conclusion that a job that becomes
"female" results in a downgrade of the status, and pay, for that job. Id. at 25-6. In fact, job
segregation is so prevalent that at least one commentator has suggested that the litmus test for
achieving the end of job segregation will be if a job can attract and retain white men in sufficient
numbers to overcome the former stigma and identification of a job as "female." Blumrosen,
Wage Discrimination and Job Segregation: The Survival of a Theory, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1, 7
(1980); see also Wider Opportunities for Women, supra note 16 (majority of all working women
whose earnings are below the poverty level are employed in female-dominated jobs, creating a
two-tier wage system).
18. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974).
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biases against women are removed, standing under Title VII should be
interpreted broadly to encourage as many suits as necessary to achieve
the statute's goal of equal employment.
In light of the continuing second-class status of women workers and
the many other instances in which Title VII standing is bestowed
freely, it is difficult to explain the decisions limiting male standing.19
However, this Article will scrutinize the male standing cases in an
effort to assist future courts and practitioners working in this area of
the law. The Article will review the conflict among the courts, con-
cluding that the Ninth Circuit's restrictive reading of standing under
Title VII is inconsistent not only with traditional principles of stand-
ing but also with achievement of Title VII's stated purpose. Before
reaching that conclusion, it is first necessary to articulate basic stand-
ing principles, apply them to Title VII, summarize the types of Title
VII plaintiffs granted standing in the past, analyze the cases involving
the need to expand standing, and evaluate numerous policy concerns
in light of the results reached by these decisions.
I. GENERAL STANDING PRINCIPLES
Numerous legal commentators have found standing doctrine con-
fused,20 and some have disparaged its usefulness.21 But beginning in
19. One possible explanation for these opinions is the perpetuation of a social, economic, and
legal policy of subordinating women. Specifically, men are not allowed to seek redress for actual
injuries they have suffered as a result of discrimination against women because they have vitiated
their superior position in society by working in a "woman's" job. As Andrea Dworkin succinctly
puts it: "Men renounce whatever they have in common with women so as to experience no
commonality with women .... A. DwoRKiN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 53
(1981). Another possible explanation is that Title VII has played the same role in deradicalizing
the civil rights movement of the late 1950's and early 1960's that the Wagner Act did in the labor
movement of the 1930's. While the civil rights movement was primarily, if not exclusively,
concerned with race relations, Title VII can be viewed as a preemptive strike against an emerging
women's movement. This thesis is inspired by Karl Kare's work, particularly his conclusions
that New Deal legislation fostered the co-optation of the workers' movement and a diminution of
labor's combativeness. He argues that collective bargaining has become an institutional structure
not for expressing workers' needs and aspirations, but for controlling and disciplining the labor
force and rationalizing the labor market. The more integrated labor becomes in the economic
system of, advanced capitalism, the more dependent it becomes on its corporate adversaries.
Klare finds that the legal consciousness, legal institutions, and legal practice, as revealed by the
Supreme Court's early Wagner Act decisions, contributed to the deradicalization and
incorporation of the working class. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the
Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness; 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. Rlv. 265, 267-69 (1978).
However, it is beyond the scope of this Article to review and analyze how the courts and the legal
process may have systematically deradicalized and incorporated minorities and women.
20. Even the Supreme Court has admitted the problems with understanding standing: "We
need not mince words when we say that the concept of 'Art. III standing' has not been defined
with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court which have discussed
Washington Law Review Vol. 64:365, 1989
1970,22 the Supreme Court has attempted to give more definition to
the blurred lines. In a series of cases, the Court has declared that
plaintiffs must satisfy not only the constitutional limit on standing
contained in article III of the Constitution23 but also "prudential prin-
ciples by which the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of
broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated
and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to
assert a particular claim."24
First, under the immutable constitutional standing requirement of
article III, federal courts are confined to adjudicating actual "cases"
and "controversies." Article III effectuates the separation of powers
on which the federal government is founded and the limited role of
judicial review in a democratic society.25 This core component of
standing requires a plaintiff to "allege personal injury fairly traceable
to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief."26
it ...." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). The Court also found that "[s]tanding has been called one of 'the
most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of public law.'" Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99
(1968); see also Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV.
645 (1973).
21. It has been suggested that the technical concept of standing is, in reality, a disguised
judicial decision on the merits. For example, in Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A
Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REV. 479, 480 (1972), Robert A. Sedler accused many judges
of taking a "Gestalt approach" towards standing, with the real concern simply whether they
should hear the case on its merits. Taking that accusation one step further, Mark Tushnet has
opined that decisions on questions of standing are simply concealed decisions on the merits of the
underlying claim. Tushnet, The New Law ofStanding: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 663 (1977).
22. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
23. Article III provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States... to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and
Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States ....
U.S. CONST. ART. III.
24. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979); see also Clarke v.
Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Valley Forge
Christian College, 454 U.S. 464; Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orga, Inc., 397 U.S.
150.
25. Wright, 468 U.S. at 750.
26. Id. at 751 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). However, some scholars argue that the
Constitution does not even require this basic allegation of legal injury caused by defendant and
susceptible to redress through the litigation. See, e.g., Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea
for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 679 (1977).
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Second, beyond the constitutional requirement, the federal judiciary
has created a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of
standing. The Supreme Court developed the notion of prudential limi-
tations on standing for two primary reasons: (1) to avoid repeated con-
frontations with other branches of government which upset the
delicate separation of powers balance,2 7 and (2) to conserve scarce
judicial resources that need to be preserved for their most important
historical functions.2" Thus, the Court has decided not to hear: (1)
suits by plaintiffs asserting jus tertii, or rights of another;29 (2) cases
involving "'abstract questions of wide public significance' which
amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and most
appropriately addressed in the representative branches";30 (3) unripe
cases;31 (4) moot cases;32 and (5) complaints which do not fall within
the "zone of interests" to be protected or regulated by a statute or
constitutional provision.33
However, these court-created prudential limitations may be over-
ruled when Congress enacts legislation that expands or restores stand-
ing to the full extent permitted by article 11 1 .34 Congress can do this
explicitly in a statutory provision conferring a private cause of action,
or implicitly by using the broadest terms possible: "a person claiming
to be aggrieved., 3 1
For instance, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,36 the
Supreme Court found that there is expansive standing under Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act,37 a sister provision to Title VII. The plaintiffs
were two white tenants who alleged that their landlord discriminated
against nonwhites and thereby caused the plaintiffs to lose the social
benefits of living in an integrated community as well as business and
professional advantages accruing from living with members of minor-
27. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974).
28. See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 471-76.
29. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). But see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(to permitjus tertii standing was to recognize the impact of the gender-based legal drinking age
on the third-party vendor).
30. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
31. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502-03 (1961).
32. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974). But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
33. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
34. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (citing Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)); see also Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987);
Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 862 (1985).
35. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1972).
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3631 (1982).
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ity groups. Based upon the Court's interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage granting a private cause of action to the "person aggrieved," 38
the white plaintiffs were found to have standing to protest the housing
discrimination against minorities.
Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, referred to various
factors in reaching this conclusion: (1) the importance of broad stand-
ing when private persons are the primary method of obtaining compli-
ance with the statute, (2) the statutory language indicating a
congressional intent to define standing as broadly and inclusively as
allowed by article III, (3) legislative history relating to the purpose of
the law, and (4) interpretations of the governmental agency responsi-
ble for administering the law, which are entitled to great weight if
consistent.39 In the midst of its analysis, the Court even cited with
approval a case drawing the identical conclusion under Title VII that
standing under that statute should be broadly construed.'
II. APPLICATION OF STANDING PRINCIPLES TO CASES
ARISING UNDER TITLE VII
Congress incorporated the same magic words that appear in Title
VIII, "person claiming to be aggrieved," in the Title VII provision
granting a private right of action for violations of the statute. 4' There-
fore, a persuasive argument exists that Congress intended to override
any prudential limitations and that only article III concerns need be
met to achieve standing under Title VII.42 This position is fully sup-
ported not only by the language itself, creating a private cause of
action, but also by a simple comparison of that language with the Title
VII section defining a violation of the Act. While the Act makes
employment practices unlawful if they constitute discrimination
against any individual because of "such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin,"43 the private cause of action provision
lacks identical words of limitation. Rather than restricting the right to
38. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1982).
39. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209-11.
40. Id. at 209 (citing Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971)).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982): "[A] civil action may be brought against the respondent
named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by
a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the
alleged unlawful employment practice." (emphasis added).
42. See Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 848-50 (7th Cir. 1982) (en bane); EEOC v.
Mississippi College, 626 E2d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); EEOC
v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 452 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978); Hackett v.
McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 447 (3d Cir. 1971).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
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sue to an individual discriminated against because of his race, color,
religion, sex or national origin, the statute accords that right to "any
person claiming to be aggrieved" by a violation of the law.' By not
repeating the restrictive language, Congress appears to have intended
to draw a distinction between the two sections, with the latter clearly
being more expansive. Thus, under the statute, anyone injured by sex
discrimination should have standing to sue to redress that discrimina-
tion, whether or not that person was the direct target of
discrimination.
While the Supreme Court has yet to consider this precise issue
under Title VII, the above conclusion is entirely consistent with the
Court's interpretation of Title VIII, the sister provision to Title VII.45
Nonetheless, several appellate and lower courts have applied, in addi-
tion to article III requirements, one particular prudential standard in
Title VII cases: the "zone of interests" test.46
The zone of interests test was first articulated by the Supreme Court
in a 1970 case, Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp.47 According to the zone of interests test, plaintiffs
arguably must be within the "zone of interests to be protected or regu-
lated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."48 In cre-
ating the zone of interests test, the Court rejected the previous "legal
interest" test because that test concerned the merits instead of simply
ascertaining standing. As a consequence, the class of people eligible to
sue under the statute was enlarged. 9 Thus, Association of Data
44. Id § 2000e-5(f)(1) (emphasis added).
45. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). Subsequent to
Trafficant4 the Supreme Court expanded Title VIII standing even further to allow nonresidents
to challenge discriminatory housing practices. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91 (1979).
46. See Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1986); Allen v.
American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Christman v. American
Cyanamid Co., 578 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. W. Va. 1983); Minority Employees v. Tennessee Dep't of
Employment See., 573 F. Supp. 1346 (M.D. Tenn. 1983); Juarez v. Quintero, 530 F. Supp. 267
(N.D. Cal. 1981); LaBoeufv. Ramsey, 503 F. Supp. 747 (D. Mass. 1980), rev'dsub nom. Costa v.
Markey, 677 F.2d 158 (Ist Cir. 1982); Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 246 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Evans V. Lynn, 376 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 537 F.2d 571 (2nd Cir. 1975), cerL denied sub nom. Evans v. Hills,_429
U.S. 1066 (1977).
47. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, the Court
conferred standing on a data processing company to enforce a statute prohibiting banks from
engaging in any activities other than banking services, finding that the company was within the
zone of interests protected by the statute. The statute, on its face, did not state that Congress
intended to protect non-bank data processors from bank competition, so the Court resorted to
legislative history to determine congressional intent. Id at 154-56.
48. Id at 153.
49. Id. at 153-54.
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Processing may be viewed as liberalizing prior prudential standing lim-
itations. Although the viability of the zone of interests test has since
been questioned, it continues to be de rigeur in reviewing standing.50
While acknowledging the conflict between those courts holding that
Title VII standing requires satisfaction only of article III and those
courts applying prudential limitations as well, it is nevertheless possi-
ble to identify certain situations in which standing has been found
regardless of the test applied.51 Historically, courts generally have rec-
ognized three categories of plaintiffs as having standing under Title
VII: Plaintiffs asserting (1) direct discrimination; (2) discriminatory
work environment or deprivation of rights of association with pro-
tected classifications; and (3) retaliation against third parties. 52 The
50. In Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 70-71 (1984), G.R. Nichol, Jr.,
states that the Supreme Court itself is inconsistent in applying the zone of interests test.
According to Nichol, between 1970 and 1982 the test went unmentioned in 25 Supreme Court
cases in which it appeared to be relevant. Id. at 73 n.30; see, eg., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). This criticism
is somewhat blunted by the fact that, to date, the Court has discussed zone of interests in at least
20 cases since Association of Data Processing. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986); Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 262
(1986); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S.
340, 345-48 (1984). As recently as December 1987, the Supreme Court applied the zone of
interests test. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987). In Clarke, Justice White
wrote an extensive review of the zone of interests test, specifically acknowledging its applicability
beyond agency review cases. Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and O'Connor did not join in the
majority opinion insofar as it engaged in a "wholly unnecessary exegesis on the 'zone of interests'
test," but concurred in the result. Id. at 410. Therefore, it is impossible to conclude that the
zone of interests test is no longer utilized by the Court.
51. This Article is primarily concerned with suits involving individual plaintiffs and excludes
issues relating to class actions. Although some of the cases discussed herein may be class actions,
that aspect is not relevant to the fundamental issue addressed. In addition to standing issues,
class actions involve Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 concerns. See, eg., Harriss v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Greene, Title VII Class Actions. Standing
at Its Edge?, 58 U. DET. J. OF URB. L. 645 (1981).
52. Other scholars have also noted some of these categories, among others. For instance, L.S.
Greene, in Greene, Title VII Class Actions: Standing at Its Edge?, 58 U. DET. J. OF URB. L. 645
(1981), accepts the applicability of the zone of interests test and finds that the arguable zone of
interests protected by Title VII is broad, encompassing "freedom from direct and indirect
discrimination in the workplace, and freedom from harms to conscience." Id. at 654. Greene
isolates five specific types of standing which meet the Title VII zone of interests test: (1) disparate
treatment, (2) disparate impact, (3) heterogeneous associative rights, (4) homogeneous
associative rights, and (5) freedom from psychological injury as a token. Id. at 654-67. The
present Article includes Greene's first and second types, along with direct retaliation, under the
first category of direct discrimination; her third, fourth, and fifth types (insofar as the courts have
interpreted these as an aspect of a discriminatory work environment or associational deprivation)
are included under the category of indirect discrimination. Greene does not address the third-
party retaliation concerns or the heart of this Article: standing of an individual who, although
not the direct subject of discrimination, suffers pecuniary injury as a result of that discrimination.
E.g., Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
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latter two groups involve "indirect" discrimination or discrimination
aimed at someone other than the plaintiff. The present Article advo-
cates recognition of an additional form of indirect discrimination, that
which occurs when an employer discriminates against a protected
class, resulting in pecuniary injury to someone not in that protected
class. Men who work in job classifications primarily comprised of
females and who receive depressed wages because their employers dis-
criminate against women are striking examples of the victims of this
form of indirect discrimination.
A. -Direct Discrimination
The first category of plaintiffs having Title VII standing consists of
members of a group against whom direct discrimination is alleged.
This discrimination can take the form of either disparate treatment53
or disparate impact.54 A subcategory, of course, is the "reverse dis-
crimination" plaintiff, usually an individual who complains that ame-
liorative efforts to correct prior discrimination adversely affect him.55
Retaliation against a victim of direct discrimination also fits under this
grouping 5 6
This concept of direct discrimination can extend to more remote
circumstances. For instance, a line of cases involves the issue of
whether Title VII protects employees from adverse employment deci-
sions because they have a relationship with someone of a different
race. In Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh Day Advent-
53. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). The
Supreme Court stated that this was the most easily understood type of discrimination: "The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
54. Id. The Court has explained disparate impact as "employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity." See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971). The Court recently has extended disparate impact analysis beyond
traditional application to facially neutral, objective employment practices, such as standardized
tests, and applied the analysis to a subjective, discretionary promotion system that had a
disparate impact on blacks. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
55. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In order to attribute standing
under these circumstances, the Supreme Court first had to find that Title VII protects whites as
well as blacks from certain forms of racial discrimination. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281 n.8 (1976); see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616
(1987) (applying holding of Weber in sex discrimination context).
56. Title VII expressly prohibits retaliation against an individual exercising her rights under
the statute and creates a separate violation for such retaliation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982);
see Whatley v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 632 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1980);
Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), vacated
in part on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
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ists, 57 a district court found that a white female who alleged that she
was fired because of her social relationship with a black male had a
valid claim under Title VII. When the defendant sought dismissal of
the action, asserting that the plaintiff was not discharged because of
her race, the court decided that if she had been black instead of white
the employer would not have objected to the relationship, and she
would not have been fired. Therefore, the adverse employment action
was based on her race.
58
B. Indirect Discrimination
The courts have expanded standing beyond plaintiffs who are the
direct targets of discrimination. Courts uniformly confer standing on
plaintiffs who claim a relatively abstract injury to themselves resulting
from a work environment tainted by discrimination against others, as
well as plaintiffs who suffer because an employer's direct retaliation
against a friend or a relative spills over to affect them. In other words,
courts have recognized the standing not only of plaintiffs with more
abstract injuries but also of plaintiffs more attenuated from the direct
discriminatory action of the employer.
1. Discriminatory Work Environment
One group of indirect discrimination victims is composed of individ-
uals who assert that discriminatory conduct by their employer against
a protected employee other than themselves has resulted in a violation
of their own right to a discrimination-free work environment or to
association with members of protected classifications.59 This relatively
57. 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
58. Id. at 1366; see also Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888 (1 lth Cir.
1986) (employer refused to hire applicant married to someone of a different race); Reiter v.
Center Consol. School Dist., 618 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1985) (white teacher's contract not
renewed because of her association with the Hispanic community); Gresham v. Waffle House
Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (rejecting prior precedent in the jurisdiction in order to
follow Whitney); Holiday v. Belle's Restaurant, 409 F. Supp. 904 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (when white
female fired because her employer thought she was married to a black man, she had a Title VII
claim because if she had been black, she would not have been discharged); Gutwein v. Easton
Publishing Co., 272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d 740 (1974) (white discharged for interracial relationship),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975). EEOC opinions are also consistent with Whitney. See infra
notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F. 2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980). This type of claim
was proposed in a Note following Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
Note, Work Environment Injury Under Title VII, 82 YALE L.J. 1695, 1695 (1973) ("Under this
theory discriminatory practices directed at one group taint the work environment and thereby
cause injury to all employees."). A hostile work environment resulting from discrimination
against others is to be contrasted with those actions brought by a protected plaintiff claiming
direct discrimination against her, resulting in a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Erebia v.
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novel theory evolved from the Title VIII housing discrimination case,
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.'° The Trafficante
Court held that the prohibition against discrimination in housing pro-
tected not only those persons who were the intended targets of dis-
criminatory activity, but also indirect victims-persons desiring
interracial associations whose associative rights, as well as potential
business contacts, are undermined by racist housing practices.61
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon an earlier Title
VII case, Hackett v. McGuire Brothers, Inc., 62 in which the Third Cir-
cuit had found that a retired employee had standing to represent a
class of current employees. As early as 1971, the Hackett court had
determined that the statutory language of "person aggrieved" showed
a congressional intent to define standing as broadly as permitted by
article 111.63 This interpretation, coupled with a congressional policy
of eradicating discrimination, prompted the court to find standing,
stating:
The national public policy reflected.., in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964... may not be frustrated by the development of overly
technical judicial doctrines of standing or election of remedies. If the
plaintiff is sufficiently aggrieved so that he claims enough injury in fact
to present a genuine case or controversy in the Article III sense, then he
should have standing to sue in his own right and as a class
representative. 64
Thus, the Third Circuit early on laid the groundwork for the Traf-
ficante decision and for subsequent broad standing decisions under
Title VII.
Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp.; 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985) (Mexican-American plaintiff
complained of a hostile work environment), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (female plaintiff claimed sexual harassment); Taylor v.
Jones, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981) (black plaintiff brought action based on racist work
atmosphere). However, a type of hybrid case has emerged. In Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp.
1269 (D.D.C. 1988), a female employee who was not the direct object of sexual harassment
nonetheless had Title VII standing, because she was forced to work in an atmosphere of
harassment. Id. at 1278.
60. 409 U.S. 205 (1972); see also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91
(1979) (Traff cante holding expanded to give standing to third parties not residents of a housing
project to challenge discriminatory practices of project); supra notes 36-40 and accompanying
text.
61. 409 U.S. at 212 ("We can give vitality to § 810(a) [codified as 42 U.S.C. § 3601] only by a
generous construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured
by racial discrimination in the management of those facilities within the coverage of the
statute.").
62. 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971).
63. Id
64. Id at 446-47.
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After Trafficante, at least six federal courts of appeal have borrowed
the Title VIII associational standing concept and applied it to Title
VII in order to find a right to work in an environment unaffected by
prohibited discrimination. 6 These results are further supported by
dicta in the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson.66 In Meritor Savings Bank, the Court declared that Title VII
protects female workers from sexual harassment, stating:
In concluding that so-called "hostile environment" (i.e., non quid pro
quo) harassment violates Title VII, the EEOC drew upon a substantial
body of judicial decisions and EEOC precedent holding that Title VII
affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discrimi-
natory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. 67
Thus, the Court noted with favor EEOC interpretations of Title VII
and the appellate precedent recognizing a cause of action based upon a
discriminatory work environment.68
One case cited by the Meritor Savings Bank Court was the 1976
District of Columbia Circuit court opinion in Gray v. Greyhound
Lines, East. 69 The D.C. Circuit held that a black plaintiff who slipped
through discriminatory screening practices and was hired on his first
application had standing under Title VII to sue his employer, based on
a theory that his workplace isolation, resulting from being one of the
few favored blacks, adversely affected his mental state.70 The court
determined that Congress intended to grant broad standing under
Title VII and that the psychological injuries claimed by the plaintiff
satisfied the article III requirement of an injury in fact.71 However,
even if Congress had not decided to grant standing under Title VII to
all who are constitutionally eligible, the Greyhound Lines court noted
65. Clayton v. White Hall School Dist., 778 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1985); Stewart v. Hannon, 675
F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 915 (1978); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
915 (1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
66. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
67. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 65-66. The Court cited Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert
denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), as "the first case to recognize a cause of action based upon a
discriminatory work environment." See also infra note 73 and accompanying text. Subsequent
cases cited by the Court were: Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir.
1977) (harassment based on national origin); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St.
Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977) (harassment based on race);
Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d 169 (harassment based on race); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F.
Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (harassment based on religion).
69. 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
70. Id. at 176.
71. Id. at 175.
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that it would reach the same result.72 Finding that the EEOC has
consistently interpreted Title VII to give employees the right to a
working environment free of racial intimidation, the court decided
that an atmosphere of discrimination which causes a plaintiff psycho-
logical harm also satisfies prudential standards:
This policy, the congressional determination that standing to challenge
unlawful employment practices should be liberally granted, and the con-
sistent administrative interpretation of the scope of the statute all sup-
port the conclusion that plaintiffs' claim implicates an interest "at least
... 'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated'"
by Title VII.73
Standing was to be liberally granted to effectuate a congressional pur-
pose "to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of
ethnic discrimination."'74
The Fifth Circuit followed its own precedent 75 as well as Trafficante
when it held in EEOC v. Mississippi College7 6 that a white female
plaintiff could assert a charge of race discrimination in recruitment
and hiring of faculty members. The plaintiff had complained that the
discrimination against blacks affected her working environment.
Rejecting a defense that the plaintiff was asserting the rights of others,
the court declared: "Our decision today does not allow Summers to
assert the rights of others. We hold no more than that, provided she
meets the standing requirements imposed by Article III, Summers
may charge a violation of her own personal right to work in an envi-
ronment unaffected by racial discrimination. '77  Thus, the white
female plaintiff had standing to assert that her employer's racially dis-
criminatory policies against others created a hostile working environ-
ment for her.
The Sixth Circuit also has adapted the Trafficante analysis to Title
VII. In a 1977 case, EEOC v. Bailey Co.,78 that court held that Traf-
ficante mandated Title VII standing for a white person who suffers
72. Id. at 176.
73. Id.
74. Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
75. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1971). Even before
Traff cante, the Fifth Circuit found that the "relationship between an employee and his working
environment is of such significance as to be entitled to statutory protection." 454 F.2d at
237-238. Thus, a female Hispanic professional had standing under Title VII to assert that
patient segregation and steering could constitute a subtle scheme designed to create a working
environment poisoned with discrimination. Id at 239.
76. 626 F.2d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
77. Id
78. 563 F.2d 439, 459-52 (6th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978).
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loss of benefits from lack of association with racial minorities at work.
Based on a similarity of statutory language and design, identical pur-
pose to outlaw discrimination, and the EEOC's consistent and persua-
sive interpretations, the Sixth Circuit held that a white female plaintiff
had standing under Title VII to file a charge with the EEOC pro-
testing alleged race discrimination against blacks by her employer.7 9
In 1982, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged, in Stewart v. Hannon,"s
that a white plaintiff had standing to assert loss of important benefits
from interracial associations in the workplace. Similarly, both the
Eighth"1 and Ninth 2 Circuits have applied the analysis of Trafficante
to Title VII cases. As the Ninth Circuit stated:
[T]he interpersonal contacts-between members of the same or different
races-are no less a part of the work environment than of the home
environment. Indeed, in modem America, a person is as likely, and
often more likely to know his fellow workers than the tenants next door
or down the hall. The possibilities of advantageous personal, profes-
sional or business contacts are certainly as great at work as at home.
The benefits of interracial harmony are as great in either locale. The
distinction between laws aimed at desegregation and laws aimed at equal
opportunity is illusory. These goals are opposite sides of the same
coin.83
Therefore, injury deriving from a discriminatory work environment or
a deprivation of association with protected classes satisfies standing.84
79. Id. at 452-54; see also Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir.)
(relying on Trafficante, court determined that Congress intended standing under Title VII to be
defined as broadly as permitted by article III), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976).
80. 675 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 1982) (rehearing en banc).
81. See, e.g., Clayton v. White Hall School Dist., 778 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1985). However,
even though the Eighth Circuit recognized the "work environment" or "benefits of association"
theory, it nonetheless dismissed a white employee's claim that the school district employer
applied a policy against her to deprive her child of free tuition so that a black child could also be
denied free tuition. Id. at 460; see also Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 1981).
82. See, e.g., Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
915 (1977).
83. Waters, 547 F.2d at 469.
84. Numerous lower courts have followed this general rationale, allowing claims based upon
a discriminatory work environment to be brought by a plaintiff who is not the direct target of the
discrimination. See, e.g., Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 562, 572 n. 15
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Smithberg v. Merico, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 80, 82-83 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
Richardson v. Restaurant Mktg. Ass'n, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 690, 694-95 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Bartelson v. Dean Witter & Co., 86 F.R.D. 657, 665 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Badillo v. Central Steel &
Wire Co., 495 F. Supp. 299, 305 (N.D. Ill. 1980); NOW v. Sperry Rand Corp., 457 F. Supp.
1338, 1344 (D. Conn. 1978); EEOC v. McLemore Food Stores, Inc., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1356, 1357 (W.D. Tenn. 1977). Cf Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F.
Supp. 1149, 1168 n.83 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (district court recognized work environment theory but
found it inapplicable where evidence of discrimination was insufficient).
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There is, however, a series of cases in which courts have denied
standing to plaintiffs complaining about discrimination against a
group of which they are not members. In these cases plaintiffs, gener-
ally seeking class action repesentative status, do not assert any injury
to themselves from the discrimination."5 Therefore, they do not meet
the basic article III requirement that injury be caused by the defendant
and redressable by litigation at issue. These cases are distinguishable
from work environment standing decisions since the plaintiffs failed to
claim that the employer's discrimination against others resulted in an
injury to plaintiffs---only that the employer discriminated against
others.8 6 If the plaintiffs had asserted their own work environment
injury, or if the courts had acknowledged other types of injury result-
ing from the employer's improper discrimination against others,
standing would have been found under this theory.
In short, the many federal circuit courts that have considered the
hostile work environment theory have all bestowed standing on plain-
tiffs asserting this form of indirect discrimination. Even though dis-
criminatory work environment standing is explicitly recognized by
85. See, eg., Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1979), cert
denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980) (male plaintiffs could not bootstrap own claim based upon alleged
past discrimination against women in a distinguishable position); Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern,
Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (male could not present claim of discrimination
against women); EEOC v. Quick Shop Mkts., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 526
F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1975) (parties not aggrieved had no standing to enforce subpoenas in race
discrimination investigation); EEOC v. National Mine Serv. Co., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1233, 1234 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (white union president could not represent a class action based on
discrimination against blacks); Thomas v. Ford Motor Co., 396 F. Supp. 52, 62 (E.D. Mich.
1973), aff'd, 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975) (white plaintiff not
qualified to represent a class asserting discrimination against blacks); Martin v. Safeway Trails,
Inc., 59 F.RD. 683, 684 (D.D.C. 1973) (black male plaintiff had no standing to represent female
or national origin class in sex discrimination suit). Moreover, any discussion about standing of
the plaintiffs in these cases is nonexistent or, at best, conclusory.
86. There are a few cases in which plaintiffs did assert a personal injury as a result of
employers' discriminatory attitude toward others, but the opinions ignore the very real injury
suffered by plaintiffs to focus solely on the targets of the employers' discrimination in denying
standing. Hence, such cases provide no rational precedent. In one case, a male plaintiff stated
that his job offer was withdrawn after telling an incumbent female employee about his higher
salary offer. The court simply ignored his loss-of-a-job-offer injury and cast the case as plaintiff
"in essence claiming that defendant engaged in sex discrimination by offering him a higher wage
than defendant paid an already existing female employee." Pecorella v. Oak Orchard
Community Health Center, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 147, 149 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 728
(2nd Cir. 1983). Similarly, in Ripp v. Dobbs House, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 208-09 (N.D. Ala.
1973), disapproved by McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), even though
the white plaintiff claimed he was fired for associating with black coworkers, the court
determined that the "employment practices which plaintiff attacks in his complaint are practices
which result in disparate treatment of black employees. Plaintiff avers that he is a white citizen.
The employment practices, subject to challenge in this action, have no impact upon plaintiff."
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courts, many practitioners seem unaware of its availability, as wit-
nessed by the relative dearth of such cases compared to the thousands
of Title VII cases filed. Many plaintiffs could assert such a claim,
either alone or in conjunction with a direct discrimination action. The
scope of discovery, and the likelihood of resisting summary dispositive
motions, would be enlarged greatly, as would the threat perceived by
defending employers. This strategy might also enhance a plaintiff's
chance of at least partial success on the merits, thereby resulting in a
greater potential for winning attorneys' fees.87
2. Third-Party Retaliation
Another category of indirect victims is composed of third parties
who, while not the direct victims of discrimination, assert that they
were retaliated against as a result of a friend or relative's protests of
unlawful discrimination under Title VII."s For instance, a husband
who was discharged by his employer following his wife's protest that
she was not hired by the same employer because of its sex discrimina-
tory policies has been permitted to assert a retaliation claim under
Title VII. 9 Similarly, a woman who claimed she was discriminated
against by a federal agency in reprisal for her husband's antidis-
criminatory activities had standing, even though she was not the per-
son whose protected activities were allegedly being impeded by the
employer's retaliatory actions.90 The courts have acknowledged such
third-party standing despite the absence of express statutory language
under Title VII conferring standing. Instead, they have emphasized
that the clear intent of Congress to protect activities protesting dis-
crimination would be undermined by construing Title VII to deny
standing.91
87. Under Title VII, the court may allow reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
88. See supra note 56.
89. Kornbluh v. Stearns & Foster Co., 73 F.R.D. 307, 312 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
90. De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 580-81 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 686 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
91. See, e.g., id. at 580. In its analysis of the standing issue, the court in De Medina stated:
In enacting Section 2000e-3, Congress unmistakably intended to ensure that no person
would be deterred from exercising his rights under Title VII by the threat of discriminatory
retaliation. Since tolerance of third-party reprisals would, no less than the tolerance of
direct reprisals, deter persons from exercising their protected rights under Title VII, the
Court must conclude ... that section 2000e-3 proscribes the alleged retaliation of which
plaintiff complains.
Id.; see also Kent v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1628, 1634
(E.D. La. 1982).
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3. Male Standing Cases
The final category of indirect victims of discrimination is repre-
sented by the cases spurring this Article.92 Plaintiffs in these cases
have challenged traditional notions of standing. They have demanded
that standing encompass male employees who, while not the direct
target of sex discrimination, are nonetheless injured by unlawful con-
duct in other than an associational sense.9" These male plaintiffs have
received lower pay because their employers discriminated against
women;94 have been laid off because their employers discriminated
against women;95 have been fired because their employers discrimi-
nated against women;96 and have been denied promotional opportuni-
ties because their employers discriminated against women.97
Extending standing to these male plaintiffs is consistent with emerging
doctrine as illustrated by the above discussions of discriminatory work
environment and third-party retaliation cases. 99
In all three situations, plaintiffs are not the direct victims of discrim-
ination; they are injured as a result of their employer's discrimination
against someone else, usually a coworker. For example, in Patee v.
Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., oo one of the male standing cases
at issue, the Ninth Circuit denied standing to male employees who
worked in what had traditionally been a "woman's job" and received
allegedly depressed wages because of their employer's discrimination
against their women coworkers. At the same time, the Patee court
granted standing to women plaintiffs who worked in the very same job
92. See Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 826 F.2d 12 (5th
Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988); Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel.
Co., 803 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1986); Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.),
cert denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984), overruled on other grounds, Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing
Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987); EEOC v. Beaver Gasoline Co., 584 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1978)
(per curiam); AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 664 F. Supp. 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Allen v.
American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Bastian v. Barnes & Reinecke,
Inc., No. 85 C 8041 (N.D. IlL. Dec. 5, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
93. See supra notes 59-87 and accompanying text (discussing hostile work environment).
94. See, e.g., Peters, 818 F.2d at 1165-66; Patee, 803 F.2d 478; Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 709;
AFSCME, 664 F. Supp. at 66-67.
95. See, e.g., Allen, 644 F. Supp. at 1556-57.
96. See, e.g., Beaver Gasoline, 584 F.2d at 1263--64.
97. See, e.g., Bastian v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., No. 85 C 8041 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1985)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
98. See supra notes 59-87 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
100. 803 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1986).
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classification as the males."° ' The only distinction between the hostile
work environment cases and cases like Patee is the nature of the plain-
tiffs' injuries: Patee involved a loss of wages, a more concrete injury
than the relatively abstract right to work in an environment free of
discrimination. It seems inequitable that, in the Ninth Circuit, Title
VII plaintiffs have standing to assert associational rights but, if they
happen to be males, lack standing to assert pecuniary rights as indirect
victims of discrimination.
Additionally, there really is no difference between cases like Patee
and third-party retaliation suits other than the fact that retaliation,
and not discrimination per se, is at issue. This, however, is irrelevant
as Title VII proscribes both retaliation and discrimination, and the
same statutory section provides a private cause of action for both. 0 2
Thus, in order to deny standing to these male victims, the courts have
either had to ignore completely or to distinguish improperly the estab-
lished categories of Title VII standing analysis.
As discussed above, a plaintiff under Title VII must satisfy the arti-
cle III test for standing and, arguably, even the prudential zone of
interests test.'03 The first is satisfied by asserting an injury caused by
the defendant which can be redressed through legal action. All of the
plaintiffs in the cases discussed herein have been injured, either by
depressed wages or lost jobs or benefits, as a result of their employer's
discriminatory actions against women allegedly in violation of Title
VII. The remedies sought in their complaints would redress the inju-
ries caused by their employers. Therefore, article III has been satis-
fied. Under persuasive precedent, this alone should be sufficient to
find standing.
Nonetheless, under the assumption that prudential concerns are rel-
evant to Title VII claims, it is also necessary to address whether the
plaintiff is within the "zone of interests" to be protected by Title VII.
This analysis is more complex. Because the statute does not expressly
address who is within its zone of interests, legislative history and statu-
tory interpretations by the administrative agency responsible for pub-
lic enforcement of the Act must be consulted. "o
101. Patee, 803 F.2d 476; see infra note 166; see also Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740
F.2d 686, 709 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984), overruled on other grounds, Atonio v.
Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
103. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text (discussing application of standing
principles to cases arising under Title VII).
104. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-11 (1972).
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a. Legislative History Regarding the Purpose of Title VII's
Prohibition of Sex Discrimination
Even a microscopic examination of the legislative history of Title
VII sheds no light on congressional intent as to who has standing to
assert sex discrimination. As the Supreme Court has wryly noted,
"[t]he legislative history of Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion is notable primarily for its brevity."' ' Addressing the problem
more fully in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title
VII at the last minute on the floor of the House'of Representatives. The
principal argument in opposition to the amendment was that "sex dis-
crimination" was sufficiently different from other types of discrimina-
tion that it ought to receive separate legislative treatment. This
argument was defeated, the bill quickly passed as amended, and we are
left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's
prohibition against discrimination based on "sex." 10 6
In fact, during months of House committee hearings prior to full
floor discussion of Title VII, the issue of sex discrimination was never
even considered. 107 The amendment adding "sex" to the prohibited
classifications was added by Representative Howard Smith of Virginia,
the bill's principal opponent, during a two-hour House debate only
two days before the House sent the bill to the Senate, in a thinly veiled
attempt to defeat the entire bill.'0 8 In support of his amendment, Rep-
resentative Smith did little more than to read a bizarre letter into the
record. The letter was purportedly from a female constituent and
claimed that every woman should have the right to a "husband of her
own."' 1 9 The amendment passed 168 to 133.110
Although the entire bill suffered through several months of debate
in the Senate, the sex amendment went without challenge and virtually
without comment. As a result, at least one commentator perceives the
prohibition against sex discrimination to be "more as an accidental
result of political maneuvering than as a clear expression of congres-
sional intent to bring equal job opportunities to women." '' An often
105. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1079
(1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
106. 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (citations omitted). Arguably, the inference from Justice
Rehnquist's comment is that Title VII treats race and sex discrimination identically..
107. See, eg., 110 CONG. Rtc. 2566-2584 (1964).
108. Id at 2577.
109. Id
110. Id at 2584.
111. Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L.
R v. 877, 884 (1967).
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quoted comment from a contemporary periodical characterized the
amendment as a "mischievous joke perpetrated on the floor of the
House of Representatives." ' 2 However, another view is that the
Smith amendment was passed in reliance "on two principal argu-
ments: sex discrimination [is] wrong, and white women should not be
left at a disadvantage vis-a-vis black women." ' 3 Regardless of view,
there remains no committee hearing nor report to explain or aid in
interpreting the prohibition of sex discrimination and its implications
as to standing to enforce private rights.
Even though the legislative history of Title VII's prohibition against
sex discrimination is sorely lacking, there appears to be no doubt that
Congress intended to " 'strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treat-
ment of men and women' in employment."'1 4 At least the Supreme
Court has never been timid in declaring that Congress had such an
intent in passing Title VII:
We begin by repeating the observation of earlier decisions that in enact-
ing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to pro-
hibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in
employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, reli-
gion, sex or national origin, and ordained that its policy of outlawing
such discrimination should have the "highest priority."115
Thus, in decisions reviewing Title VII claims, the Court has inferred
congressional intent to eradicate sex discrimination in employment.
This inference supports a liberal concept of standing-a concept
which would dictate the grant of standing to all plaintiffs injured by
discrimination, including male plaintiffs in cases like Patee and the
other male standing cases discussed in this Article.
b. EEOC Interpretations of Title VII Standing
When the legislative history of a statute is unclear, it is appropriate
to look to the administrative interpretation of the act by the enforcing
agency, in this instance the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion ("EEOC")." '6 While the EEOC interpretation is not controlling,
it does "constitute a body of experience and informed judgement to
112. Sex and Nonsense, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 4, 1965, at 10.
113. Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title VII and
Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L. REv. 453, 467 (1981).
114. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1976) (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))).
115. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (emphasis added and citations
omitted).
116. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
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which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.""' 7
Although early decisions ascribed great deference to EEOC rulings,118
subsequent cases have looked to see if the EEOC interpretation at
issue is consistent, persuasive, and contemporaneous.' 1 9
The EEOC has been relentlessly consistent in bestowing standing
upon any "aggrieved" employee under Title VII. In 1969, the first
EEOC decision addressing this question held that white female com-
plainants could challenge an employer's racially discriminatory pre-
employment testing, stating:
The Commission interprets Section 706(a) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, to mean that any employee has standing to file a
charge of employment discrimination alleging the commission of any
unlawful employment practice by his employer, because it constitutes a
term or condition of employment for all employees. Although the
charging party is not a member of the class against which the allegedly
unlawful employment practices are directly committed, we believe it
clear that an employee's legitimate interest in the terms and conditions
of his employment comprehends his right to work in an atmosphere free
of unlawful employment practices and their consequences. 120
Similarly, the EEOC found probable cause of a Title VII violation
when an employer discharged a white employee because of his friendly
association with black employees. 121 The EEOC reaffirmed its liberal
position yet again in 1971 when it held that every employee has a right
to a working environment free from unlawful discrimination; there-
fore, the EEOC had jurisdiction to consider claims even where they
involved racially discriminatory practices which did not directly
aggrieve the white complainant.
122
117. Meritor Say. Bank 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
118. See, ag., Gn'gg 401 U.S. at 433-34.
119. See, eg., Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141-42. In Gilbert, the Court declined to give great
deference to the EEOC Guidelines relating to pregnancy benefits, stating that the Guidelines
were not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII since they were not promulgated until
eight years after Title VII was enacted, and that the EEOC pronouncements regarding the issue
were inconsistent. Id at 142-43.
120. EEOC Decision No. 70-09, 1973 EEOC Decisions (CCH) 116026, at 4049 (July 8, 1969).
121. EEOC Decision No. 71-969, 1973 EEOC Decisions (CCII) % 6193, at 4328 (Dec. 24,
1970); see also EEOC Decision No. 79-03, 1983 EEOC Decisions (CCII) S 6734, at 4742 (Oct. 6,
1978) (cognizable claim that adverse employment decision was based on association with another
race); EEOC Decision No. 76-23, 1983 EEOC Decisions (CCH) 6616, at 4513 (Aug. 25, 1975)
(white not hired because sister was living with a black and had two interracial children); EEOC
Decision No. 71-1902, 1973 EEOC Decisions (CCH) 1 6281, at 4498 (Apr. 28, 1971) (female
clerk-typist fired for interracial dating).
122. EEOC Decision No. 72-0591, 1973 EEOC Decisions (CCH) 6314, at 4562 (Dec. 21,
1971).
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In conclusion, while the EEOC did not confront this particular indi-
rect discrimination standing issue until 1969, its rulings have been
consistent and persuasive in support of finding standing even if the
Title VII plaintiff is not the direct target of the discrimination. In
cases like Patee, 23 for example, the plaintiff is in just such a position.
While the employer is discriminating directly against women, the male
plaintiff invoking standing nevertheless suffers an injury relating to his
terms or conditions of employment as a result of that unlawful dis-
crimination. Thus, both congressional intent as inferred by the Court
and EEOC interpretations support the recognition of standing in cases
like Patee. Male plaintiffs invoking standing are within the zone of
interests protected by Title VII.
c. Application of Title VII to the Male Standing Cases
The courts have already recognized the standing of plaintiffs in posi-
tions relatively attenuated to the protected employee who is subjected
to direct discrimination. Specifically, courts have allowed white plain-
tiffs who complain of a work environment infected with discrimination
against minorities to stay in court,124 as well as a husband who is dis-
charged in retaliation for his wife's protesting the employer's discrimi-
natory practices against women.1 25 When standing accrues in these
two situations, logic urges that a man who receives the same depressed
wage as his female coworkers because of the employer's bias against
women-a situation even closer to direct discrimination-also has
standing.
Additionally, the legislative history of Title VII and judicial inter-
pretations of congressional intent to eradicate discrimination in the
workplace support this extension of standing by finding such injured
male plaintiffs to be within the zone of interests protected by Title
VII. 126 The EEOC has consistently defined standing as broadly as
possible in its internal opinions. 127 Thus, all of the indicia identified in
Trafficante 128 are present, and all support the finding of standing.
Nonetheless, several courts have denied standing, including the
Ninth Circuit in Patee 129 and in Spaulding v. University of Washing-
123. 803 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1986).
124. See supra notes 59-87 and accompanying text (discussing discriminatory work
environment standing).
125. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing third-party retaliation).
126. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history about the
purpose of the sex prohibition of Title VII).
127. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC interpretations).
128. 409 U.S. 205 (1972); see also supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
129. 803 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1986).
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ton,'30 the Eastern District of New York in AFSCME v. County of
Nassau, 131 and the Northern District of Illinois in Bastian v. Barnes &
Reinecke, Inc. 132 However, all of these courts rely on three faulty
types of reasoning. First, they depend on an unduly and unjustifiedly
restrictive reading of "person aggrieved."' 33 As discussed earlier, all
indicators, including Supreme Court dicta, are to the contrary. Con-
gress has used the language "person aggrieved" not to restrict standing
but to expand it as far as possible consistent with article III require-
ments. The courts should do likewise.
Second, the courts denying standing mistakenly perceive male plain-
tiffs to be asserting the right of their female coworkers to be free from
discrimination based on their sex.' 34 This variation of jus tertii is a
mischaracterization of the male plaintiffs' complaint. Their suit may
coincidentally serve to support their female coworkers' claims, but,
first and foremost, they are asserting their own right to be free from
injury as a result of discrimination prohibited by Title VII.
Third, the courts state that men have no standing because they do
not claim to have been discriminated against because they are men. 135
If this were a correct statement of standing under Title VII, only
direct victims of discrimination (e.g., women discriminated against
because they are women and blacks discriminated against because they
are black) would be protected by Title VII. But every court of appeals
that has confronted the issue of indirect discrimination in the context
of both hostile working environment and third-party retaliation cases
has acknowledged standing under these circumstances. 136 There sim-
ply is no rational basis for distinguishing the instant male standing
question from these other forms of indirect discrimination. If any-
130. 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984), overruled on other grounds,
Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987).
131. 664 F. Supp. 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
132. No. 85 C 8041 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
133. See, eg., Patee, 803 F.2d at 478-79.
134. Id.
135. See, ,'g., Spaulding 740 F.2d at 709; AFSCME, 664 F. Supp. at 66; Bastian, No. 85 C
8041 (N.D. Il. Dec. 5, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
136. See, e.g., Clayton v. White Hall School Dist., 778 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1985); Stewart v.
Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 849-50 (7th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482-
83 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 453-54
(6th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169,
176 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976), cerL
denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977).
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thing, the more concrete injuries suffered in some of the male standing
cases 137 more strongly support a finding of standing.
The most articulate and thorough statement in favor of granting
indirect male victims standing has been the Northern District of Indi-
ana's majority opinion in Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc. 138  In
that case fifty-one employees from the LaPorte plant of American
Home Foods asserted, among other things, a sex discrimination action
based upon the employer's decision to close the LaPorte plant instead
of an alternative site. 139 The plaintiffs claimed that one of the signifi-
cant and determining factors American Home considered in reaching
this decision to close the LaPorte plant and to transfer work to
another plant was the predominance of women in the LaPorte plant as
compared to all other American Home plants.
Among the potentially dispositive motions filed in response was
American Home's motion to dismiss the Title VII claims as to male
employees."4 American Home contended that the five male plaintiffs,
who were not part of a protected class under Title VII, lacked stand-
ing to assert Title VII claims based on discrimination directed at
women. The male plaintiffs responded that Congress intended Title
VII's broad standing provision to extend standing to all persons
injured by a discriminatory employment practice. Since they were
137. See, e.g., Patee, 803 F.2d at 477; Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp.
1553, 1557 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
138. Allen, 644 F. Supp. at 1553. Although it does not contain as complete an analysis of
standing as Allen does, the earlier Third Circuit opinion in EEOC v. Beaver Gasoline Co., 584
F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1978) (per curiam), rev'g 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1343 (W.D. Pa.
1977), also supports this type of indirect discrimination standing. In that case, the trial court
found that a male employee had no standing under Title VII to challenge his demotion, allegedly
for hiring a female, because he was not discriminated against on the basis of being male. Id. By
its reversal, the Third Circuit recognized that a male plaintiff has standing to sue under Title VII
when he is injured (i.e., demoted) as a result of his employer's discriminatory practices towards
women (i.e., refusal to hire). Even though the male plaintiff was not the direct target of the
discrimination, he nevertheless suffered harm. The appellate court in Beaver Gasoline based its
per curiam order upon its earlier decision in Novotny v. Great American Federal Savings &
Loan Association, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), vacated in part on other grounds, 442
U.S. 366 (1979). The Third Circuit's reliance on Novotny implies that the plaintiff was claiming
retaliation for asserting rights under Title VII, the issue in Novotny. But the facts are closer to
the circumstances of indirect discrimination standing where the plaintiff is injured because of the
employer's discrimination against women which impacts him, not because the employer is
retaliating against him for protected activity.
139. Plaintiffs also alleged interferences with pension rights in violation of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and
discrimination based on age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 621-34 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
140. 644 F. Supp. at 1555.
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"aggrieved" by American Home's discriminatory employment prac-
tice, they should have standing under Title VII."4'
In analyzing the standing issue, the Allen court acknowledged that
the male plaintiffs were not alleging reverse discrimination, jus tertii,
nor retaliation. Instead, plaintiffs claimed "that American Home's
decision to close the plant at which they worked was based, at least in
part, on the sex of their female coworkers. They assert their own inju-
ries; they assert their own rights."' 4 2 Having narrowed the issue, the
court then discussed at length the problem of male standing.
First, the court looked to the statutory language of Title VII. Com-
paring the provision generally defining the employment practices
declared unlawful (actions taken against an individual employee due
to that employee's race, color, sex, or national origin) with the section
granting a private cause of action (any "person claiming to be
aggrieved"),143 the court found no explicit restriction within Title VII
against standing for one who, although outside a protected class, suf-
fers real injury due to an unlawful employment practice.144
Next, in seeking guidance as to the correct interpretation of "person
claiming to be aggrieved," the Allen court determined that most juris-
dictions hold that "any plaintiff who suffers an injury due to an
employer's unlawful business practice is sufficiently aggrieved to have
standing to file a civil action."' 45 However, the cases cited by the
court in support of this proposition were all injunctive actions; in
Allen, the male plaintiffs sought damages.' 46 Although Title VII pro-
vides for legal and equitable remedies, it does not explicitly impose
variable standing requirements. In both work environment standing
cases in which injunctive relief is sought and indirect discrimination
141. Id.
142. Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553, 1556 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
143. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
144. Allen, 644 F. Supp. at 1556.
145. Id The cases cited by the Allen court were Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th
Cir. 1976) ("white female had standing to sue to redress discrimination against blacks and
Spanish-sumamed employees"), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977); Hackett v. McGuire Bros.
Co., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971) ("pensioner, although not an employee, could be a person
aggrieved by employment practice under Title VII"); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir.
1966) ("EEOC could bring suit based on white female's charge -of discrimination against
blacks"), cert denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978); Bartelson v. Dean Witter & Co., 86 F.R.D. 657 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) ("white female had standing to sue for discrimination against blacks"); cf Novotny v.
Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978) ("male had standing to sue
when discharged because 'his actions and advocacy stood in the path of a plan to deprive women
of their equal employment rights' "), vacated in part on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). Most
of these cases fall under the classic category of work environment standing. See supra notes
59-91 and accompanying text.
146. Allen, 644 F. Supp. at 1556.
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cases in which legal relief is sought, the remedy pursued alleviates the
wrong. Nevertheless, without indicating why the remedy sought
should alter the broad standing test articulated, the court assumed the
relevancy of the zone of interests test and proceeded to address that
aspect of standing.147
After generally discussing the common law prudential standing con-
cept of zone of interest, the Allen court properly analyzed the opinions
of the administrative agency responsible for enforcing Title VII, the
EEOC. It found the EEOC's position unequivocal: Standing attaches
to "anyone protesting any form of alleged employer discrimination, on
the theory that all employees have a right to work in an atmosphere
free from unlawful employment practices."' 48
Finally, the Northern District of Indiana in Allen reviewed prece-
dent in the Seventh Circuit. The primary case noted was Stewart v.
Hannon,49 in which a white assistant principal sued to enjoin a test
which allegedly excluded black teachers from positions as principals,
resulting in the plaintiff's loss of important benefits from interracial
associations in the workplace. While acknowledging the differences
between Allen and Stewart, 150 the court nevertheless found its broad
interpretation of "person aggrieved" to be compelling, concluding
that:
These males suffered the same injury as did the females that lost their
jobs; the injuries of the males and females were occasioned by the same
corporate decision; and if, as the plaintiffs allege, considerations of sex
motivated the corporate decision to close the LaPorte plant, the corpo-
rate decision that injured the male plaintiffs constituted an unlawful
employment practice under Title VII.151
Thus, based on a sound consideration of the statutory language of
Title VII, precedent, agency interpretations, and associational benefit
standing, as well as practical considerations, the Northern District of
Indiana in Allen determined that men have standing to assert a Title
147. Id. at 1556-57.
148. Id. at 1557 (citing EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975)); EEOC
Decision No. 72-0591, 1973 EEOC Decisions (CCH) 6314, at 4562, 4564 (Dec. 21, 1971);
EEOC Decision No. 71-969, 1973 EEOC Decisions (CCH) 9 6193, at 4328, 4329 (Dec. 24,
1970); EEOC Decision No. 70-09, 1973 EEOC Decisions (CCH) 6026, at 4049 (July 8, 1969).
149. 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
150. Id. Compare Stewart, which involved race discrimination and sought equitable relief
based upon an injury to associational benefits, with Allen, 644 F. Supp. at 1555-56, which
concerned money damages for sex discrimination in setting wages.
151. Allen, 644 F. Supp. at 1557.
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VII violation even if they are not the direct target of the
discrimination.15 2
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has taken the opposite position,
restricting male standing under Title VII and twice denying standing
to male plaintiffs who received depressed wages as a result of their
employers' alleged discrimination against female coworkers. In
Spaulding v. University of Washington, 15 the Ninth Circuit held that a
male plaintiff had no standing under Title VII even though he received
the same low salary as female plaintiffs. While comparable worth was
the primary issue in Spaulding, 54 a male faculty member had joined in
pressing the suit, in which the predominantly female nursing faculty
claimed they received lower wages than male-dominated faculties of
other university departments for substantially equal work. The male
plaintiff's claim was premised on an allegation that he received a sal-
ary "infected" by the discrimination the female faculty members suf-
fered in violation of Title VII.'55 The court denied standing to the
male plaintiff in a single paragraph of the eighteen-page decision with-
out ever expressly referring to standing.'56 Instead, the court stated in
conclusory terms that the male plaintiff made "no claim that he
received a lower wage because of his sex."' 5 7 Obviously, this result
would deny standing to all but "direct" victims of discrimination.
152. d at 1557. This result is entirely consistent with earlier Fifth Circuit precedent in the
race context. In EEOC v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. Freight, Inc., 659 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1981), four truck
drivers, two white and two black, alleged that the company had a policy not to allow transfer
from city to line jobs in order to prevent blacks who were allowed to hold only city jobs from
becoming line drivers. The white drivers articulated a theory that, although this policy was
directed against black drivers, they were imbued with the same loss of job opportunity. In a
footnote, the court acknowledged their standing to pursue the claim, provided they established a
personal injury. Id. at 692 n.2. The court relied upon a prior Fifth Circuit case, EEOC v.
Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), that
recognized work environment standing, but found that the injury to the white plaintiffs in
T.I.M.E-D.C Freight was even more substantial. The court stated that not only could each
white plaintiff claim a violation of his "'personal right to work in an environment unaffected by
racial discrimination,' . . . but each can also claim a deprivation of the same employment
opportunity denied to the black claimants." T.I.ME-D.C Freight, 659 F.2d at 692 n.2.
153. 740 F.2d 686, 709 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984), overruled on other
grounds, Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987).
154. The concept of "comparable worth" demands that employers cease paying women less
than men for work that requires comparable skill, effort and responsibility. Its proponents
believe that the pay disparity between female-dominated and male-dominated positions of
comparable value constitutes sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. See Spaulding 740
F.2d at 705 n.10.
155. Id. at 709.
156. Id
157. Id (emphasis added). Even though the female plaintiffs might be able to frame a
cognizable claim, the court decided that the male employee would not be allowed to "bootstrap"
his job grievance into a similar federal suit. He was summarily dismissed without a hearing on
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The Ninth Circuit entirely failed to address its earlier decision,
Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 158 in which it found the holding in Traf-
ficante to be persuasive in granting work environment standing under
Title VII. The opinion in Waters emphasized the importance of the
workplace in modem society, stating that the "distinction between
laws aimed at desegregation and laws aimed at equal opportunity is
illusory."15 9 With the Ninth Circuit previously recognizing work
environment standing accruing to a plaintiff with a less concrete injury
than the one asserted in Spaulding"6 as a result of discrimination
directed at someone else, it is difficult to understand the court's logic
in denying standing in Spaulding. Certainly, the white plaintiff in
Waters 161 was not asserting a claim based on his race, but rather based
on his employer's discrimination against minorities. The court simply
offers no meaningful explanation for its decision.
This issue of indirect standing surfaced again in the Ninth Circuit in
1986. This time, however, the court devoted substantial analysis to
the issue. In Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 162 three
male employees appealed the dismissal of their claim of sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII. The male employees had alleged in their com-
plaint that they were paid a lower salary as "maintenance
administrators" than they previously received as "test desk techni-
cians" performing the same work.163  The reason for this depressed
wage, according to the male plaintiffs, was that Pacific Bell discrimi-
nated against women, and the change in job title was accompanied by
a change in the predominant sex in the job classification-from men to
women. 1"4 The district court, relying on Spaulding, 165 held that the
the merits of his claim. In dismissing the case, the court relied solely on an earlier case in which
male correction officers were not allowed to bootstrap their job grievances onto a federal claim on
the ground that females in that position may have had a claim based on past practices. Ruffin v.
County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980);
see also Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 704 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Gerdom v.
Continental Airlines, 648 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated in part, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983); Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977).
158. 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977).
159. Id.
160. Spaulding, 740 F.2d 686.
161. 547 F.2d 466.
162. 803 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1986).
163. Id.
164. Id. The underlying facts, which are assumed to be true in conformance with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), are that the job performed by the male plaintiffs as
maintenance administrators for $422.50 per week was formerly performed by test desk
technicians for $527 per week-an almost 20% reduction. Moreover, the diminished wage rate
was coincident to a drastic change in the composition of workers performing that job, from
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male employees "lacked standing under Title VII to seek redress for
wages lost due to alleged discrimination directed at a protected class to
which plaintiffs do not belong." '66 Thus, the reason for dismissal was
the lack of direct discrimination.
In affirming the dismissal, the Ninth Circuit held that the statutory
private cause of action contained in Title VII, which endows standing
on a "person claiming to be aggrieved," 167 must be read restrictively to
give standing only to the direct and immediate victims of the discrimi-
natory practices, i.e., women in this particular case. The crux of the
Ninth Circuit's opinion was that the male workers did not claim they
had been discriminated against because they were men. Rather, they
attempted to assert a claim that they received lower pay because of
sex-based wage discrimination directed at female employees. 168 And,
according to the court, the holding in Spaulding required it "to con-
clude that the male workers cannot assert the right of their female co-
workers to be free from discrimination based on their sex." 169 How-
ever, contrary to the court's analysis, it is clear that the male plaintiffs
were not attempting to vindicate their female coworkers' rights; they
were seeking redress for the depressed wages that they received.
After raising the spectre of jus tertii, the court next addressed the
concept of associational standing approved by the Supreme Court in
predominantly men to predominantly women. When the male employees requested that the
employer pay them the amount previously received by the test desk technicians for the identical
work, Pacific Bell refused. Subsequently, the male employees filed a charge of sex discrimination
against Pacific Bell with the EEOC. That agency dismissed the charge and issued right to sue
letters which led to this action. Id. at 476-77.
165. 740 F.2d at 709. In affirming the district court's decision in Patee, the Ninth Circuit also
cited Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (male lacked
standing to present claim of discrimination against women in absence of asserting an injury to
himself). Patee, 803 F.2d at 478.
166. Patee, 803 F.2d at 477. A separate action for a declaratory judgment on the same
ground was filed on behalf of female employees who held the position of maintenance
administrators. See Forsberg v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1988).
That matter was not before the Ninth Circuit in this appeal from the dismissal of the male
employees' suit. In other words, women employees in the identical situation as male employees
were allowed to pursue their suit while the men were denied the same opportunity.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
168. Patee, 803 F.2d at 478.
169. Id. In a lapse of doctrinal compartmentalization, the Ninth Circuit admitted that
appellants were correct in pointing out that the district court specifically relied upon the doctrine
of standing to dismiss Patee while the Ninth Circuit itself did not even refer to standing in
denying the male faculty member's claim in Spaulding. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit stated
that this distinction was without substance because Spaulding indicated that the appellants were
not entitled to relief, and the court noted that the concepts of standing and entitlement to a
remedy overlap, citing Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1079 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert -denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987). Patee, 803 F.2d at 478.
Washington Law Review
Trafficante. The court correctly opined that associational standing
was not squarely on point with Patee because the male employees did
not complain about an injury based on a denial of interpersonal con-
tacts with fellow women employees or a deprivation of harmonious
relationships.17 In fact, the male employees asserted their own, per-
sonal concrete injury of depressed wages as a result of the employer's
discrimination against women. Disregarding the very real injury suf-
fered by the male plaintiffs, the court decided that "[t]he serious con-
sequences that flow from the exclusion of persons because of
discrimination in housing and in hiring are not present here." '171
This is a peculiar conclusion since other courts have refused to limit
work environment standing to discriminatory hiring practices, instead
including such varied practices as discriminatory promotion poli-
cies 172 and segregation of clients."' While the bulk of the discrimina-
tory work environment cases involve fact patterns connected with
hiring, none of the cases explicitly limits standing to hiring situations.
Rather, in stating the employee's right to a discrimination-free envi-
ronment, all employment practices will be subjected to scrutiny.
Unfortunately, some other courts have followed the Ninth Circuit's
charge in denying standing. In AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 174 the
Eastern District of New York relied on Patee even though it acknowl-
edged the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of "person claiming
to be aggrieved" in Trafficante to extend standing under Title VII as
far as is permitted by article III. The court nevertheless withheld
standing from the male plaintiffs because their injuries did not place
them within what the court identified as the prudential test of the stat-
170. Patee, 803 F.2d at 479.
171. Id. at 479.
172. Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532
F.2d 511 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976).
173. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
174. 664 F. Supp. 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). In AFSCME the trial court was confronted with a
request to certify a class of all Nassau County civil service employees who, since July 28, 1982,
had worked in "traditionally female jobs." Plaintiffs defined these jobs as those having 70% or
more female employees in 1967, when the County implemented its present classification and
compensation system. The certification was sought only for the Title VII claims, and not for
Equal Pay Act claims simultaneously being pursued. In opposition to the certification, the
defendant argued, among other things, that the proposed class could not be certified because it
included men, who lack standing to sue for employment discrimination against women. The two
named male plaintiffs alleged that they were underpaid because they work at "traditionally
female jobs." In other words, although they are men, they assert that they are victims of the
alleged discrimination by the county against women. As the court aptly noted, the male plaintiffs
were not claiming that their associational rights had been violated by being denied interpersonal
contacts with women but rather that, but for the defendant's discrimination against women, they
would be paid more. The males asserted their own injuries and their own rights. Id. at 66.
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ute's zone of interests: "'[T]he male workers do not claim that they
have been discriminated against because they are men.' ,,175 In doing
so, even the court acknowledged the strangeness of its decision as well
as the appeal of Allen's reasoning:
It may be argued that it is anomalous for title VII plaintiffs to have
standing to assert associational rights while lacking standing to assert
pecuniary rights. As a matter of public policy, it is perhaps strange that
a plaintiff may come to federal court with a complaint that he is losing
associational benefits which are hard to quantify, while he is barred
from complaining of a loss of easily quantifiable dollars. Title VII, how-
ever, focuses on whether the plaintiff suffers discrimination because of
who he is.... [The male plaintiffs herein] do not contend that they are
underpaid because they are men. To the contrary, they allege that they
are men who are being mistreated because they are being treated like
women. As such, they have not stated a claim under title VII. Should
this be bad public policy, the remedy is with Congress.176
Still, the court was firm in its interpretation that Title VII focuses on
whether the plaintiff suffers discrimination because of who he is:
"Unlike the Allen court, this court holds that the absence of injury to
the men as men is a fatal flaw for title VII purposes." ' 17 7
Obviously, this opinion is internally inconsistent. The Eastern Dis-
trict first acknowledges that Trafficante supports a reading that Title
VII standing should be construed as broadly as permitted by article
III and then constricts that standing by applying the prudential zone
of interests test in a limiting fashion.17 Moreover, the court is wrong
in its attempt to distinguish associational benefits standing by implying
that those plaintiffs are denied the benefits of associating with mem-
bers of minority groups because they are white. This is inaccurate.
The guilty employer in a discriminatory work environment case does
not discriminate against white plaintiffs directly-the focus of discrim-
ination is against minorities. The white plaintiffs are hurt only indi-
rectly by the loss of associational and other types of benefits. A cogent
evaluation of work environment standing does not negate but rather
supports recognition of standing under these circumstances.
Another example is Bastian v. Barnes and Reinecke, Inc., 179 in
which both wife and husband plaintiffs asserted injuries under Title
175. Id at 66 (quoting Patee, 803 F.2d at 478).
176. AFSCME, 664 F. Supp. at 67.
177. Id
178. Id. at 66.
179. No. 85 C 8041 (N.D. Il. Dec. 5, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (slip opinion of
Judge McGarr).
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VII: She claimed to have been subjected to sexually harassing remarks
and demands for sexual favors, and he claimed that the defendant fur-
ther implied that the wife's acquiescence would also assure the hus-
band's success at the company. The husband, Paul, asserted that the
refusal of his wife, Linda, to grant sexual favors resulted in his being
denied pay raises and promotions. In dismissing the husband's claim,
the judge stated:
Paul only alleges that his wife was subject to sexual harassment and that
her failure to acquiese in the supervisor's demands for sexual favors hurt
his employment benefits. The injury to Paul, however, was not because
of his sex, but because of his relationship with Linda. In the absence of
allegations that Paul was the victim of discrimination based upon his
sex, Paul's Title VII claim fails.180
This case illustrates the conceptual proximity of all plaintiffs claim-
ing a personal violation of Title VII as a result of indirect discrimina-
tion and the resulting confusion when some plaintiffs are selected for
standing and others are not. If attempting theoretical consistency, the
Bastian case should be categorized as a type of hostile work environ-
ment discrimination, which has been recognized by all courts consid-
ering the issue.'8 ' Nonetheless, the court failed to make the
connection. Instead, it exercised somewhat myopic vision when it dis-
missed a husband who alleged the very real injury of loss of pay raises
and promotions as a result of his employer's discrimination against his
coworker spouse.
Paul Bastian would have had standing, pursuant to controlling Sev-
enth Circuit precedent,' 82 if he had expressly claimed that his
employer violated Title VII by denying him association with his wife,
a member of a protected class discriminated against and constructively
discharged by his employer. Attorneys representing plaintiffs like
Paul Bastian must learn to aggressively resist dismissal for lack of
standing. Their chances of doing so will escalate markedly if they will
only recognize the ultimate importance of simply controlling the light
in which their claims are cast.
III. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit in Patee and the Northern District of Indiana in
Allen, in decisions ten days apart, arrived at opposite conclusions after
180. Id. (emphasis added). Paul Bastian's wife was allowed to stay in court to press her
sexual harrassment suit asserting constructive discharge.
181. See supra notes 59-91 and accompanying text.
182. Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
Vol. 64:365, 1989
Expanding Male Standing Under Title VII
examining whether men, who are injured as a result of their employ-
ers' discrimination against women, have standing under Title VII. At
the same time that the Ninth Circuit acknowledged a broad concept of
standing, it proclaimed that Title VII language ("person claiming to
be aggrieved") must be read restrictively to entitle only the direct and
immediate victims of the discriminatory practices to pursue their
claims in court.I83 Meanwhile, the Northern District of Indiana found
that the language of Title VII must be read broadly to encompass situ-
ations similar to those giving rise to associational or work environment
standing. The result reached by the Ninth Circuit is contrary to estab-
lished precedent in third-party retaliation and discriminatory work
environment cases--cases in which discrimination against protected
classifications is a Title VII violation that gives standing to all employ-
ees, regardless of the plaintiff's sex.
The Allen court's opinion, clearly better reasoned and supported by
analogous precedent, should be adopted by future courts for several
reasons.184 First and foremost, Title VII was intended to eradicate
discrimination in the workplace.1 85 The statutory language effecting a
private cause of action to enforce the law was crafted to be as broad as
possible: "any person claiming to be aggrieved" by violations of the
Act.'86 Arguably, all members of society are hurt by discrimina-
tion.'87 But even if such a global view is forsaken for a more literal
one, workers who themselves suffer an injury at work because their
employer discriminates against someone in their workplace should be
entitled to sue to redress that injury. Because Title VII is enforced
primarily by private individuals, standing should never be converted
into a perverse technicality used merely to bar plaintiffs from having
their grievances adjudicated and their very real injuries redressed.
183. Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1986).
184. A 1987 Fifth Circuit case illustrates the continuing controversy in this area. Peters v.
City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1987), cert dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988). During
its discussion of the standing issue in dicta, the Peters court refers both to Allen v. American
Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ind. 1986), and Spaulding v. University of Wash.,
740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984), overruled on other grounds, Atonio v.
Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987), without analyzing or adopting either.
185. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982); see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205 (1972).
187. Even from a purely capitalistic perspective, the prohibition of discrimination contained
in Title VII may actually enhance rather than impair economic efficiency: "Title VII can be
understood to represent wealth-maximizing legislation rather than as some tyrannical or
misguided attempt to disregard private preferences." Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U.
PA. L. REv. 1411, 1431 (1986).
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Moreover, the courts' refusal to find standing is questionable in light
of prior cases which regularly grant standing not only for victims of
direct discrimination,"'8 but also for those indirect victims desiring
association with minority co-workers in a discrimination-free environ-
ment189 or who are retaliated against as a result of the employer's dis-
crimination against a friend or relative.19 ° Denying indirect standing
to men, who historically have been at the forefront of sex discrimina-
tion litigation, 91 only serves to restrict yet another avenue for chal-
lenging discriminatory employment practices. Consequently, it is
more likely that women, shown by empirical studies to be less likely to
file suit,192 will continue to occupy low-paying, predominantly female
jobs. 193
It would be entirely consistent with existing precedent, as well as
article III and prudential standing principles, to recognize the form of
indirect standing exemplified by the various male standing cases high-
lighted in this Article. As the Allen court stated, standing should
attach to "anyone protesting any form of alleged employer discrimina-
tion, on the theory that all employees have a right to work in an
atmosphere free from unlawful employment practices."' 94
At the very least, practitioners should be aware of the multitude of
circuits that do recognize a Trafficante-type work environment stand-
ing for indirect victims of employment discrimination.1 95 To resist
summary dismissal, plaintiffs should consider pleading in the alterna-
tive allegations that give rise to the indirect type of discrimination at
issue in both the male standing cases and the work environment cases.
This strategy not only increases the chance of establishing standing
but also expands the type of employer practices at issue and, therefore,
subject to discovery-an additional advantage. It is ironic that the
courts, by engaging in hair-splitting with the apparent result of
restricting Title VII standing, may well be forcing plaintiffs to expand
the nature of their claims just to stay in court.
188. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 59-87 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Hoyman & Stallworth, Suit Filing by Women: An Empirical Analysis, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61 (1986); Hoyman & Stallworth, Who Files Suits and Why: An
Empirical Portrait of the Litigious Worker, 1981 ILL. L. REV. 115.
193. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
194. Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553, 1557 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
195. See supra notes 59-87 and accompanying text.
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